The primary objective of the majority of social assistance schemes is to reduce poverty and targeting is often considered an important tool to reach this objective more efficiently and effectively. This paper investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of a targeted benefit scheme that uses a hybrid form of targeting and subject to a tight budget constraint, namely the social assistance scheme in Kosovo. In recognition of the long-term detrimental and negative implications of child poverty, we focus particularly on the impact on child poverty. A mixed method approach is used to investigate both the economic and non-economic costs and implications. Findings suggest that the social assistance scheme is highly efficient but excludes many poor children. Poverty impacts are limited and the scheme does not resonate well with its recipients. Policy simulations indicate that incremental budget increases have the potential to greatly reduce child poverty when implemented hand-in-hand with amendments to the current social assistance scheme.
Introduction
There is widespread evidence indicating that child poverty and vulnerability can have long-term and far-reaching consequences, causing children to be trapped in povertyabandoning old programmes that were in place in the 1990's (Gubbels et al., 2007) and have to cope with limited financial resources. Information about these schemes, their efficiency and impact on poverty and the lives of vulnerable groups is limited and sketchy. This paper aims to contribute to the knowledge base of social protection programmes in Kosovo by providing a detailed assessment of its social assistance scheme from a child perspective. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, we provide an overview of the social assistance scheme within the context of the wider social protection system in Kosovo. This is followed by an overview of the situation of child poverty in the country. Thirdly, the data and methodology are discussed. The performance of the social assistance scheme is consequently investigated from a quantitative and qualitative perspective. In addition, we discuss alternative policy options and draw final conclusions.
Social assistance in Kosovo
The development and formulation of social protection schemes in Kosovo in the beginning of the 21 st century took place under unconventional conditions and involved extreme external intervention, guided by the strategic priorities of international organizations and interests of donor agencies (Cocozzelli, 2007) . Two years after the installment of UNMIK in 1999, the focus shifted from emergency relief to the establishment of a social safety net (EC 2008 ) and the UNMIK administrative structure Department of Health and Social Welfare (DHSW) was tasked with the development of a new social assistance scheme (Cocozzelli, 2007) . In 2001, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) together with its Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was established and now carries responsibility for the social assistance scheme. Responsibilities have increasingly been shifted to the municipal level and its Centers for Social Work (CSW) as a result of the decentralization process that was started in January 2009. Payment of transfers takes place at the central level and is executed by MLSW (Roelen and Gassmann, 2009) .
Social assistance benefits in Kosovo are targeted towards poor families on the basis of a hybrid form of targeting, including categorical targeting, a proxy-means (asset) and means (income) test 1 . Social assistance is awarded to two categories of eligible families: 1) families with all dependent (out of labor force) family members that are not working or 2) families with able-bodied persons and at least one child under the age of five or orphan under the age of 15 (UNMIK 2003a) . Families must firstly belong to either one of these categories and additionally pass the asset and income test to be eligible for the receipt of social assistance. A family includes all members that are present in the household (UNMIK 2003a) and can, as such, be compared to the household as unit of analysis. Applications are handled and processed by the CSW's at the municipal level and require a set of official documents, including ID cards, marriage or divorce certificates and declarations of unemployment. Social assistance is awarded for a period of six months, after which a new application has to be submitted. The benefit level of social assistance is determined by the difference between a family's income and the monthly gross standard rate, which depends on the number of family members (UNMIK 2003a (UNMIK , 2003b . Table 1 presents the gross standard rates since the installment of social assistance in 2003 and poverty lines at the household level, adjusted for household size and composition for selected household types. Gross standard rates rise substantially when the household size doubles from one to two members but only marginally with additional family members, pointing towards a disadvantaged position for larger households. Moreover, the comparison with poverty lines at the household level indicates that benefit levels do not meet the established poverty threshold.
>> Table 1 about here The social assistance scheme has generally been considered a success for UNMIK, despite complaints about too strict eligibility criteria, inadequate benefits and minority coverage (Cocozzelli, 2007) . The scheme is considered to be very efficient and small budget increments are thought to lead to considerable reductions in poverty incidence and depth. Its success and high efficiency are attributed to the decentralized design of the scheme and the resulting lack of information asymmetries about beneficiaries' eligibility status (Gueorguieva, 2008) . Nevertheless, its size as a percentage of GDP and share of total social welfare expenditure is modest and decreasing, pointing towards the tight budget constraint that the social assistance scheme is subject to. In comparison the other countries in the region, Kosovo spends a small share of GDP on social security at a rate of 5.8 percent in 2003 (Bartlett and Xhumari, 2007) . Table 2 displays the share of social assistance as a proportion of the actual expenditures on social welfare, which includes old-age and disability pensions, electricity benefits, support for school books and foster care and social services from 2004 to 2008.
>> Table 2 here
Figures indicate that expenditures on social assistance decreased from 2004 to 2008 in both absolute terms and as share of total expenditures on social welfare. The share of expenditures dropped to almost half of its size from 35 percent to 18 percent. This decline can be explained by the reduction of the absolute amount in Euro allocated to social assistance on the one hand and the introduction of other social protection programmes on the other hand. Furthermore, the number of recipients declined in the period 2001 -2004 (Cocozzelli, 2007 as well as the period 2005 -2008 (Roelen and Gassmann, 2009 ). Roelen and Gassmann (2009) hypothesize that the reduction in the number of recipients might be attributed to two issues. Firstly, increased nominal incomes over time in combination with fixed gross monthly rates during the same period could explain a reduction in the number of eligible families. Less families are eligible when their nominal incomes have increased whilst the threshold at which their tested, the monthly gross rates, have remained the same. Secondly, verification of eligibility might have become stricter over time and result in smaller numbers of eligible households.
Child poverty in Kosovo
The measure for poverty and child poverty used for the purposes of our analysis follow the World Bank (WB) methodology to ensure consistency with the most widely available and used poverty estimates from Kosovo (see World Bank, 2007) . Household expenditures are used as the welfare indicator and equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scales to arrive at the expenditures per adult equivalent. The extreme (food) poverty line lies at € 0.93 per day and the absolute poverty line lies at € 1.42 per day in 2002 prices. Household expenditures were consequently deflated using the Consumer Price Index by IMF. All poverty estimates are weighted using a post-stratification weight. The poverty measures used in this study are the poverty headcount /incidence and poverty depth, indicating the proportion of the population below the poverty line and the average distance to the poverty line as a percentage of the poverty line. Expenditures per adult equivalent for the whole population are assessed against the absolute poverty line to obtain poverty figures for the total population. Estimates for child poverty are based on the adjusted household expenditures attached to each child and refers to the child sample population only (see also Förster and Tóth, 2001 ).
Poverty and particularly child poverty in Kosovo is widespread and persistent. Moreover, children are more prone to poverty in comparison to the overall population. Poverty estimates for the total and child population in Table 3 indicate that almost half of all children lived in poverty in 2006/07 and almost one of out of five children is extremely poor. The level of poverty incidence amongst the total population is 45 percent, which is comparable to that in previous years of /04 and 2005 /06 (World Bank, 2007 . The average income shortfall of children as a percentage of the absolute poverty line is 14 percent and 4.5 percent with respect to extreme poverty, suggesting that poverty is quite shallow. Poverty estimates indicate that gender inequality, in this respect, is limited with only slightly higher poverty rates for women and girls. Rural areas are more prone to poverty but discrepancies are limited. Regional differences, however, are more profound. Ferizaj, Mitrovice and Gjakove are the three poorest regions with poverty incidence rates for the overall population ranging from 70 to 51 percent. Gjilani is the least impoverished region with 17 percent of the total population in that region living in poverty. The breakdown of poverty rates by ethnicity indicates that Serbians experience the lowest poverty rates while ethnic minorities are most prone to poverty. Across all demographic groups, however, it can be observed that children are more disadvantaged in comparison to the populations as a whole.
>> Table 3 about here Currently, there is no social protection programme in Kosovo that is specifically targeted towards children and that addresses the widespread problem of child poverty. However, due to the design of the social assistance scheme and its eligibility criteria, the scheme is highly biased towards families with children (Roelen and Gassmann, 2009) . Despite the fact that the reduction of child poverty is not its primary objective, the acknowledgment that deprivation and vulnerability during childhood has longterm and far-reaching negative consequences calls for the need to analyze the performance of social assistance with respect to child poverty.
Data and methodology
This paper employs a mixed methods approach for the analysis of the social assistance scheme with respect to poor children in Kosovo. Mixed methods approaches can be defined as "the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques […]" (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) . As such, the so-called fundamental principle of mixed research (Johnson and Turner, 2003) is not limited to triangulation for the verification of results from a single method approach but also refers to the possible elimination of design weaknesses (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner 2007) . In our case, the mixed methods approach consists of the use of quantitative and qualitative data analysis that provide both complementary and alternative information. As such, it helps to analyze both the economic and non-economic implications inherent to the implementation of a targeted social assistance scheme.
The quantitative data used for this study is the Kosovo Household Budget Survey 2006/07, which is undertaken and managed by the Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK). The survey provides information about expenditure patterns, receipt of social benefits and socio-demographic characteristics, amongst others. A considerable limitation of the cross-sectional HBS data in Kosovo pertains to the representativeness of its sample. The sampling frame of the HBS is based on the most recent reliable census, which was held in 1981 (World Bank, 2007) . The outdated sampling frame is likely to result in under-and over-coverage and consequently biased results, despite the fact that weights have been applied to correct for some of the sampling problems.
The qualitative data used for our analysis was collected by means of focus group discussions (FDG's) and in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in the period March-April 2009 (see Roelen and Gassmann, 2009 ). The basic target group for the focus group discussion consisted of poor families with children 2 . Sampling of focus group participants took place along the lines of social assistance receipt (yes or no) and area of residence (urban or rural areas). Ethnicity was also used as a characteristic for focus group design in order to gain insight into issues specific for families of Albanian, Serbian and RAE ethnicity. Sampling took place in 5 municipalities and occurred in a random manner on the basis of CSW registers and with the help of CSW employees. Social assistance beneficiaries were selected from the list of families receiving social assistance from the CSW. Poor non-beneficiaries were selected from lists of families that had applied for social assistance but were rejected or from lists of families that received social assistance before but no longer met the eligibility criteria. The recruitment of poor non-beneficiaries in this manner excludes poor families that are not aware of the social assistance programme or that have not applied for social assistance for another reason. Nevertheless, this method of recruitment proved most feasible given the practical constraints. Table 4 presents the actual number of focus group discussions (FDG's) and number of respondents in brackets.
>> Table 4 about here In addition to the focus group discussions, the CSW directors as well as one CSW employee that is directly involved in the application and verification process of the social assistance cash transfer system in each of the 5 municipalities were invited for an in-depth interview in each selected municipality (n=10) 3 .
Performance of social assistance in Kosovo
2 The identification of poor families for the purposes of sampling focus group participants was not based on a formal assessment of their poverty status in terms of income or expenditures but on a normative judgment by CSW employees. Given that families were sampled from registers of current or past social assistance recipients and the generally low inclusion errors of social assistance, it is reasonable to assume that the focus group respondents indeed represent poor families. Results from the qualitative assessment also do not point towards a sampling error. 3 Focus group discussions and key-informant interviews were undertaken by a local research team in Albanian language led by UBO Consulting. Transcripts were provided by the local research team in English. Quotes used in this paper were directly taken from those transcripts without changing or improving the language to avoid any further manipulation of the data. Ravallion (2009) argues that an evaluation of a targeted social assistance scheme should not only be assessed against its targeting performance but also in terms of its primary objective, namely the reduction of poverty. As such, we consider the "two types of mistakes in targeting" (Cornia and Stewart, 1993 ) the inclusion and exclusion error (e.g. efficiency), the adequacy of benefits and the impact on poverty (e.g. effectiveness). Additionally, we assess socio-economic implications of the social assistance scheme such as the creation of dependency and stigma. In recognition of the long-term negative and detrimental consequences of child poverty, we focus our analysis on the specific situation of children.
Efficiency
The efficiency of a social assistance scheme is primarily assessed against its targeting performance in terms of in-and exclusion errors. Our findings are in line with previous assessments of the targeting performance of Kosovo's social assistance scheme and suggest that it operates highly efficiently. An assessment of the proportion of the non-poor child population receiving social assistance provides insight into the inclusion error of targeting (e.g. Coady et al., 2003) . Results in Table  5 point towards an inclusion error of respectively 8 percent, meaning that 8 percent of all children receiving social assistance are not poor on the basis of their pre-transfer expenditures. Inclusion errors of this magnitude are generally considered low (see Dutrey, 2007) .
>> Table 5 about here
An assessment of the distribution of children receiving social assistance over pretransfer expenditure quintiles provide further indication of the scheme's targeting performance. Estimates in Table 6 indicate that 77 percent of all children receiving social assistance belong to the poorest quintile. Only 3 percent of all child SA recipients belong to the richest 40 percent of the population. In comparison to other countries, these figures suggest that the scheme suffers from limited inclusion errors and leakage (see Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004 ).
>> Table 6 about here The above findings confirm the positive conclusions about the efficiency of Kosovo's social assistance scheme by Gueorguieva (2008) , which states that "The Kosovo Social Assistance programme is one of the most efficient in the region". Given the relatively good targeting performance of the social assistance, there is little scope to improve the channeling of benefits by tightening eligibility criteria or strengthen the targeting procedures (Gueorguieva, 2008) . From an efficiency perspective, a hybrid form of targeting including the mechanisms of categorical, proxy-means and means targeting can thus be considered to function well. The second error inherent to targeting pertains to undercoverage and the exclusion of poor people (Cornia and Stewart, 2003) . It is measured in terms of coverage rates, pertaining to the proportion of the poor population that receives social assistance benefits. The estimates in Table 7 point towards limited coverage of poor children and, as such, considerable exclusion. Coverage of poor children in Kosovo amounts to 23 percent, excluding three out of four poor children from the social assistance scheme. Coverage rates are higher when considering the poorest quintile only but still point towards large exclusion errors. Coverage is generally larger in urban areas compared to rural areas and in the Prishtine and Mitrovice regions. Children with the Serbian ethnicity experience a lower coverage rate than the Albanian majority whilst the RAE and other ethnic minorities experience a considerable higher coverage rate.
>> Table 7 about here The qualitative assessment points towards mechanisms, underlying the large exclusion error. Employees of the CSW's but also recipients and non-recipients of social assistance have indicated that the strict eligibility criteria of the social assistance scheme cause many families in need to be excluded from the receipt of social assistance. One CSW employee said "I can freely say that half of the families that don't receive social assistance deserve it but the Law is as such and we can't do anything against it." From both the focus group discussions and interviews with CSW employees, it also became evident that the age criterion for children with respect to social assistance category 2 was considered to be too restrictive. Given the current criteria, a family with at least one able-bodied member is only eligible for social assistance in category 2 when there is at least one child of age 5 or younger present. "Because my child reached the age of five. This was the only reason why I was removed from social assistance scheme. I don't think this happens anywhere else in the world, just because the child is 5 years old they stop it.", states a non-recipient from Prishtina. The age criterion is generally also considered to be illogical as more costs need to be made for children when they grow older in terms of clothes and schooling. A non-recipient from Fushe Kosove elaborates on the age criterion by saying "Social assistance for kids is given until the age of 5. As far as I know from 6 -7 years old a kid starts school and then the need for assistance is even more required. That child needs to have books, notebooks and clothing" A number of respondents have indicated that this age criterion forms an incentive for families to have additional children to ensure the compliance with social assistance eligibility criteria. Other criteria that were mentioned as being too restrictive included the medical examination and the size of the plot of land families own. With respect to the latter criterion, it was suggested to take the productivity of the land into account rather than merely the size. Owning a large plot of land might not help families to generate more income if it cannot be used for agriculture or other productive purposes.
Another aspect of the social assistance scheme that might contribute to the high levels of exclusion pertains to the application process. Recipients and nonrecipients of social assistance have indicated that the application process for social assistance is costly in terms of both time and money. The collection of required documents is time-consuming and possibly expensive if applicants have to travel to obtain their documents. Furthermore, re-application with a full set of documents after six months is considered too soon. Re-application implies that all documents have to be collected again, imposing a large burden on recipients every six months. Many respondents indicate they have difficulties finding the financial means to collect all documents and do not understand the necessity to collect all documents every time they re-apply. A non-recipient from Fushe Kosovo indicated that "Every 6 months during the reapplication process we had to fulfill the criteria to be reselected and there wasn't any problem at all the only problem was the money to get these documents." An extension of the period after which re-application is required was considered as a positive change in the system as it would also decrease feelings of uncertainty and enable families to plan their expenditures. A social assistance recipient from Ferizaj states that "I think the six month reapplication process should change or be extended to 1 year at least, so we don't have to think about completing documents as often." Effectiveness Despite low coverage rates, a social assistance scheme might still turn out be effective in reducing poverty when reaching those most in need with generous benefits (Stewart and Huerta, 2009 ) The effectiveness of social assistance scheme in Kosovo and its implications for child poverty is assessed by considering the adequacy of the benefit and its poverty impact. The adequacy of the social assistance benefits or its importance to income can be assessed by considering its share in income and as a proportion of the poverty line. Table 8 presents the size of the social assistance benefit as a share of total household expenditure for all children and child recipients by quintile. Furthermore, it evaluates the size of the social assistance benefit as a share of the poverty line at the individual level. The social assistance benefits represent 2 percent of total household expenditure when averaged over all children and 31 percent when considering only those children that receive social assistance. Social assistance benefits represent almost half of total expenditures for child recipients in the poorest quintile, pointing towards the importance of social assistance to income for these children. Despite the social assistance benefit representing a considerable proportion of total household income of the poorest children, one cannot conclude that benefits are generous. An evaluation of the social assistance benefit at the individual level (adjusted for household size and composition) as a share of the per capita poverty line points towards the limited adequacy of social assistance benefits. At most, social assistance benefits amount to one-thirds of the poverty line. This share is similar across all quintiles, confirming the small degree of variation in benefit sizes.
>> Table 8 about here Results from the qualitative assessment point towards a similar conclusion with respect to the adequacy of benefits. Focus group respondents as well as CSW employees are negative about the adequacy of social assistance benefits. Benefits do not suffice to cover a family's basic needs and social recipients indicated that they are not able to make ends meet on the basis of the monthly social assistance benefit. The benefit level is too low to allow for the spreading of expenses over the full month and coping strategies include buying on credit with stores, collecting iron or searching through garbage. A social assistance recipient from Deçan said "The amount that is given from social assistance I can tell you that doesn't even cover the minimum needs. If this amount was bigger it would be better because nobody receives this assistance for pleasure but to survive and feed the family." A similar comment was made by a social assistance recipient from Fushe Kosove: "Social assistance secures our food for two weeks after that we have to search through garbage cans and that's how we feed ourselves.
[…] If we are stopped from collecting food from garbage cans I don't know how else we can live, we don't do this for pleasure but to survive." Recipients' indications of spending patterns suggest that benefits are primarily spent on food and medicines and that schooling for children, clothing and housing costs only come in as a second priority. "We usually owe food from a store, the owner trusts us because immediately after receiving social assistance we do the payment. He gives us food depending on the amount we receive from social assistance. I can't afford to buy clothing with 70€.
[…] Most of the spending goes for food and medications." says a social assistance recipient from Fushe Kosove. A social assistance recipient from Ferizaj stated: "I try to cover the month with what I have and what is left I need to get food from a store and pay back with the assistance money. School for me is obliged and sometimes I have to make sacrifices for myself and please my kids."
The impact on child poverty is assessed by estimating poverty rates before and after transfers, as presented in Table 9 . Estimating child poverty for the group of social assistance beneficiaries without the existence of a social assistance scheme 4 confirms the important contribution of social assistance benefits. In line with findings in Bulgaria, Albania and Moldova (see Stewart and Huerta, 2009) , it can be observed that the impact on the poverty gap is greater than that on the poverty headcount. Estimates for child poverty incidence suggest that the risk to absolute child poverty is only slightly smaller with the social assistance scheme present. The risk to extreme child poverty decreases by approximately 3 percentage points The absolute poverty gap closes by 3 percentage points whilst the extreme poverty gap decreases considerably to almost half the size.
>> Table 9 about here

Socio-economic implications
In addition to the assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of the social assistance scheme, we also consider broader socio-economic implications such as the creation of perverse incentives on the labor market and stigma. This assessment is primarily based on the analysis of qualitative data. Findings with respect to creation of dependency as a result of social assistance were mixed. Whilst some respondents indicated that the receipt of social assistance might lead to disincentives with respect to employment, others indicated that there are too little employment opportunities for social assistance recipients to find a way out of social assistance and that the level of benefits is too low to become dependent. Whilst one CSW employee stated that "Social assistance creates parasite and takes away the person from the regular work schedule. That person doesn't have the willingness to work anymore, ex. if I invite a social assistance recipient to work for a day, and I may probably pay him 10€, he won't accept because he receives social assistance [...]", another CSW employee said "[...] I don't think it (SA) makes people dependent because a lot of people who were employed in some companies now these companies don't function anymore. These people now are without jobs so they are imposed to apply for social assistance." Stigma and feelings of shame appear to be related to the dire living conditions that poor children find themselves rather than the social assistance scheme per se. Many parents mentioned that children are embarrassed to go to school because do not have proper clothing or shoes or books and that they are bullied by other children because of their poor living conditions. A social assistance recipient from Deçan expressed the feelings of her son by saying "One day my son came home crying because other kids told him that you are poor, you don't have a home and many other offensive things."
In sum, the assessment of the targeting performance of the social assistance scheme strongly underlines the "efficiency and coverage paradox" (Dutrey, 2007, p 4) . The social assistance scheme in Kosovo can be considered highly efficient given its small inclusion errors. At the same time, large proportions of poor children do not benefit from the scheme. As such, programmes with low inclusion but high exclusion errors that have consequently been labeled as "successful" turn out to benefit only a select group of "privileged" poor (Dutrey, 2007) . There is no consensus on when the efforts towards reaching perfect targeting and efficiency defeat the purpose of a social assistance scheme in terms of poverty reduction and effectiveness. Nevertheless, many scholars have pointed towards the inability of targeting performance to be an indicator of the poverty impact of the programme under consideration (see Van de Walle, 1998; Cornia and Stewart, 2003; Ravallion, 2009) . Van de Walle (1998) and Ravallion (2003) argue that although the improvement of targeting performance has its merits, it should be considered an instrument towards poverty reduction rather than an aim in itself. Moreover, improvements made in terms of targeting performance are not indicative of similar improvements with respect to poverty reduction. In reference to the efficiency-effectiveness trade-off, Cornia and Stewart (2003) further argue that the exclusion of the poor should be a considered an even graver issue than it already is due to the loss of investment in children's lives and the likely negative future consequences. As such, losses in poverty impact should receive greater weight than improvements in targeting performance in the assessment of social assistance schemes. The analysis also suggests that an efficient implementation of a social assistance scheme under a tight budget constraint does not resonate well with the poor target population. The strict eligibility criteria prevent many poor families and children from receiving social assistance. Especially those elements of the scheme that are not related to the family's living conditions, such as the age criterion, or considered to be too restrictive, such as the medical and asset test, create tension and misunderstandings. The thorough and strict application process, which is highly demanding in terms of both time and money, suggests that the scheme benefits the "privileged poor" but fails to reach those in most dire need. Furthermore, low benefit levels and the relatively short period of receipt of benefits does not allow for the planning of household spending, thereby upholding feelings of anxiety and insecurity.
The devolution of responsibilities from the local to central level as part of the decentralization process can cut both ways in terms of the implementation of the social assistance scheme. Whilst it might allow for the minimization of information asymmetries about applicant families' eligibility and simplification of the application process, the increased administrative burden could also lead to potential capacity problems. CSW employees expressed mixed opinions about the decentralization process, ranging from the view that the process will not pose any considerable difference for either CSW employees or beneficiaries to positive predictions about the possible implications in terms of transparency and consistency of the social assistance scheme. Whilst one CSW employee stated that "I don't think this [decentralization process] will have a big impact [...]", another employee said that "Considering that now the centre will be Municipality's responsibility, the entire process will be more transparent."
Assessing alternative policy options
In response to the large exclusion of poor children and limited poverty impact of the social assistance scheme, this section investigates a number of alternative policy options. Given the inadequacy of benefits at their current level and evidence that size matters (Notten and Gassmann, 2008) , we simulate an increase in the level of monthly social assistance benefits of respectively 25 or 50 percent under the assumption that the number of social assistance recipients remains the same despite the potential implications that such a change might have for eligibility and levels of take-up. Secondly, we simulate the distribution of universal child benefits 5 by means of a monthly benefit of 10 Euro distributed to 1) all children up to age 19, 2) children under 5 years of age or 3) children age from 5 up to 16 as a universal rather than targeted scheme might actually have a greater poverty impact (Notten and Gassmann, 2008) and be more socially inclusive (Stewart and Huerta, 2009 ). The universal schemes are simulated under the assumptions of full take-up for all children in the specified age bracket. Finally, two specific amendments to the current social assistance scheme, responding to specific concerns apparent from our qualitative analysis, are analyzed. In response to recipients' concerns about increased cost associated with older children, the first amendment implies that families with children in school-age (6-18) will receive 5 Euro extra per child in this age group. This is given the current eligibility criteria and gross monthly rates and the increase in benefit levels only holds for those families with children that already receive social assistance. The second proposed amendment concerns large families as, currently, large families are discriminated against as families with 7 or more family members receive the same level of benefit. In order to account for larger family size, families with more than 7 members receive 5 Euro extra for each member. Again, this adjustment assumes current eligibility criteria and gross monthly rates.
The feasibility of some of the alternative benefit schemes largely depend on their costs. Estimates use the costs of the current social assistance scheme as starting point and assume an administrative cost burden of 15 percent for universal schemes and 30 percent for targeted schemes (see Dutrey, 2007, p. 9) 6 . As such, we only account for supply-side costs and disregard costs on the demand-side such as compliance costs 7 . Figure 1 displays cost estimates for the various alternative schemes as well as the impact on child poverty in terms of absolute poverty incidence and 5 Please note that the effects of the universal schemes are simulated assuming that there are no social assistance benefits. Furthermore, the schemes are universal, meaning that benefits are awarded regardless of the poverty status of the children. All children in the specified age groups receive the full monthly benefit. 6 Cost estimates reflect monthly costs. Cost estimates are undertaken in two different ways and based on administrative data or HBS survey data, depending on the policy option under consideration. 1) Cost estimates for the policies under the current design (i.e. the current sa scheme and the schemes with increased benefit levels by 25% and 50% increments without any changes in its design) are based on administrative data on actual expenditures on SA for December 2008 (2.101.784,00 € for benefits only). This amount is increased by 30 percent to account for administrative costs and by respectively 25 and 50 percent to account for the increments in benefit levels. 2) Cost estimates for the policies on the basis of a different design (i.e. the universal schemes and the schemes with specific adjustments in eligibility criteria) are based on the number of eligible individuals using demographic estimates from the HBS 2006/07 survey and the assumed level of benefits. This amount is increased by 15 percent to account for administrative costs for the universal schemes and 30 percent to account for administrative costs for the targeted schemes with specific adjustments. The use of different data sources for cost calculations results from 1) the inability to impute who is eligible for the receipt of social assistance under the current scheme from the HBS data and 2) the lack of population figures from administrative data for the estimation of costs for alternative schemes. 7 In all cases, we assume full take-up of benefits. Neither the data used for this analysis nor other studies/research provides us with a solid estimate on which to make assumptions about the level of compliance costs and consequent levels of take-up. The HBS data does not allow us to verify eligibility criteria (as there is no information about disability, for example) and to link this with actual receipt of social assistance benefits. extreme poverty depth, benchmarked against the situation of the current social assistance scheme.
>> Figure 1 about here An overview of the costs and poverty impacts associated with the various policy options suggests that the most expensive schemes are by no means the most effective ones. The most expensive scheme, which distributes a universal benefit of €10 to all children up to age 19, lifts a small proportion of children above the absolute poverty line but has no effect in terms of the extreme poverty gap in reference to the current situation. Estimates even suggest that changing the current scheme into a universal benefit scheme for young children or children in school-age would increase the extreme poverty gap in comparison to the current scheme. An increase of benefit levels and specific adjustments to the design of the social assistance scheme, however, do have the potential to decrease poverty incidence and, especially, extreme poverty depth. However, increasing benefit levels comes at a considerably higher cost, amounting to respectively 25 to 50 percent, in comparison to making specific adjustments to the current scheme, which amounts to 17 to 23 percent respectively. The policy option with the most appealing cost and poverty implications is the adjusted social assistance scheme with an increase of the social assistance benefit of 5 Euro for every child aged 6-18 in the family (adjustment 1). A budget increase of 17 percent has the potential to reduce child poverty incidence and particularly child poverty depth. Absolute poverty incidence decreases by 7 percent, the absolute poverty gap by 19 percent, extreme poverty incidence by 26 percent and the extreme poverty gap by 38 percent. Furthermore, it responds to recipients' concerns about the increased cost for children in school-age. In other words, fewer people sharing the pie do mean larger slices, also for children. A modest increase in budget thus has the potential to cause a significant reduction in poverty. However, the potential impact on poverty might be strengthened further if changes in budget go hand-in-hand with incremental changes in the social assistance scheme's design.
Conclusion
The strong evidence that the prevention of child poverty and vulnerability benefits both individuals and society in the long-run and the concurrent increase in acknowledgment that children deserve a special focus in poverty reduction and development policies have led to a growing interest in the impact of social assistance and social safety net programmes on child poverty. Targeting such programmes is often considered to be a more efficient and effective manner in which to reach the poverty reduction objective, although a range of economic and non-economic costs are inherent to the practice of targeting. This paper investigated the efficiency and effectiveness in both economic and non-economic terms of a social assistance scheme facing a particularly tight budget constraint and using a hybrid form of targeting. It does so with a special focus on child poverty in recognition of its long-term negative and detrimental consequences.
In line with existing evidence, the social assistance scheme in Kosovo is found to be fairly efficient and well-targeted. The large majority of benefits are awarded to the poor and only a minority of the recipients is non-poor. The scheme does, however, suffer from large exclusion errors and fails to reach a large proportion of the poor population and poor children in Kosovo. Furthermore, the impact on poverty is limited. Benefit levels are relatively low and inadequate to sustain a minimum standard of living. The impact of social assistance on the depth of child poverty is generally larger than on the incidence of child poverty, especially with respect to extreme poverty, but modest at best. The qualitative analysis suggests that specific eligibility criteria are considered illogical and unfair, the application process puts a large burden on applicants in terms of both time and money and benefits are too low to make people's lives less vulnerable.
Simulations of alternative policy options indicate that a specific adjustment to the current scheme, encompassing a benefit for children in school-age, is most attractive when compared to the introduction of a universal scheme or increase of benefit levels. A cost-benefit analysis suggests that including a benefit for children in school-age (6-18) in the current social assistance scheme has the potential to progressively reduce child poverty against a fairly modest increase of costs. Furthermore, this amendment would also respond to the perceived unfairness of eligibility criteria. As such, the potential of incremental budget changes to decrease child poverty can be used more effectively when they go hand-in-hand with slight moderations in the current social assistance scheme. 
